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Abstract
Byzantine broadcast (BB) and Byzantine agreement (BA) are two most fundamental prob-
lems and essential building blocks in distributed computing, and improving their efficiency is of
interest to both theoreticians and practitioners. In this paper, we study extension protocols of
BB and BA, i.e., protocols that solve BB/BA with long inputs of l bits using lower costs than
l single-bit instances. We present new protocols with improved communication complexity in
almost all settings: unauthenticated BA/BB with t < n/3, authenticated BA/BB with t < n/2,
authenticated BB with t < (1− ǫ)n, and asynchronous reliable broadcast and BA with t < n/3.
The new protocols are advantageous and significant in several aspects. First, they achieve the
best-possible communication complexity of Θ(nl) for wider ranges of input sizes compared to
prior results. Second, the authenticated extension protocols achieve optimal communication
complexity given the best available BB/BA protocols for short messages. Third, to the best
of our knowledge, our asynchronous and authenticated protocols in the setting are the first
extension protocols in that setting.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates extension protocols [17] for Byzantine broadcast (BB) and Byzantine agree-
ment (BA). The problem of Byzantine broadcast is for some designated party (sender) to send its
message to all parties and let them output the same message, despite some malicious parties that
may behave in a Byzantine fashion. Similarly, the goal of Byzantine agreement is to let all parties
each with an input message output the same message. We are interested in the problem of effi-
cient Byzantine broadcast and agreement with long input messages since such protocols are widely
used as building blocks for other distributed computing problems such as multi-party computation
[30] and permissioned blockchain [24]. For example, practical blockchain systems typically achieve
agreement on large (e.g., 1MB) blocks.
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A straightforward solution for BB/BA with l-bit long messages is to invoke the single-bit BB/BA
oracle l times. This approach will incur at least Ω(n2l) communication complexity where n is the
number of parties. This is because any deterministic single-bit BB/BA has cost Ω(n2) [13]. In fact,
the Ω(n2) lower bound holds even for randomized protocols against a strongly adaptive adversary
[1]. Another tempting solution is to run BB/BA on the hash digest and let parties disseminate the
actual message to each other. However, if a linear fraction of parties can be Byzantine (which is
the typical assumption), they can each ask all honest parties for the long message, again forcing
the communication complexity to be Ω(n2l).
It turns out non-trivial techniques are needed to get better than Ω(n2l) or to achieve the optimal
communication complexity of O(nl). These are known in the literature as extension protocols,
which construct algorithms for BB/BA with long input messages using a small number of BB/BA
primitives for short messages. Table 1 and 2 summarize the most related works and our new
results in the synchronous and asynchronous setting, respectively. In the tables, n is the number
of parties, t is the maximum number of Byzantine parties, l is the length of the input, A(m) is
the communication cost of m-bit BA oracle, and B(m) is the communication cost of m-bit BB or
reliable broadcast oracle. For cryptograhically secure protocols, several cryptographic primitives
have been employed in our work and prior works. To make the communication costs comparable,
we assume that the output length of the involved cryptographic building blocks are on the same
order. Specifically, let λ denote the security parameter, kh = kh(λ) denote the hash size, ks = ks(λ)
denote the signature size, ka = ka(λ) denote the output size of the accumulator (see Section 4.1),
and k = max(kh, ks, ka). We assume k = Θ(kh) = Θ(ks) = Θ(ka) = Θ(λ)
1. Therefore, in the
tables, we use the same variable k to denote the hash size, signature size and accumulator size for
ease of comparison. The expressions distinguishing the cryptographic primitives and the costs of
state-of-the-art BB/BA oracle schemes can be found in Section 2.
Contributions. All our protocols achieve the optimal communication complexity Θ(nl) for
wider ranges of input sizes (see Table 1). In addition to that, our cryptographically secure extension
protocols have the following advantages.
• They achieve best-possible communication complexity under the current best BB/BA proto-
cols for short messages. The state-of-the-art BA/BB protocols [14] have communication cost
A(1) = B(1) = O(kn2 + n3). Unless better primitives for short messages are invented, no
extension protocol can have communication cost better than ours.
• They can be easily adapted to the asynchronous setting. To the best of our knowledge, these
are the first asynchronous authenticated extension protocols and they significantly outperform
the unauthenticated ones in the literature.
• Their simplicity makes them less error-prone and more appealing for practical adoption. On
this note, in deriving our results, we discover a flaw in the prior best protocol [17, 18] and
provide a simple fix (Appendix D).
1 This assumption is reasonable since the signature scheme and accumulator scheme (see Appendix A) with the
shortest output length are both based on pairing-friendly curves, which are believed to require Θ(λ) bits for λ-bit
security based on the state-of-the-art attack [20]. As for hash functions, it is common to model practical hash
functions as random oracles, in which case λ-bit security requires Θ(λ)-bit hash size.
2The complexity of our cryptographic BB extension protocol is in fact O(nl + B(k) + A(1) + kn2). Due to the
well-known transformation [21] from BA to BB, B(k) ≤ A(k) + nl. Hence, the result in the table also holds.
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Threshold Security Problem
Communication
Complexity
Input range l
to reach optimality
Reference
t < n/2 crypto. agreement/broadcast
O(nl + nB(k) + kn3)
O(nl +A(k) + kn2) 2
Ω(n3 + kn2)
Ω(n2 + kn)
[18, 17]
This paper
t < n crypto. broadcast O(nl + B(nk) + n2B(n log n)) Ω(n5 log n+ kn4 log n) [17, 18]
t < (1− ε)n crypto. broadcast O(nl + B(k) + kn2 + n3) Ω(n2 + kn) This paper
t < n/3 error-free agreement/broadcast
O(nl + n2B(1))
O(nl + nB(1) + n3)
Ω(n3)
Ω(n2)
[27, 18]
This paper
Table 1: Extension Protocols for Synchronous Byzantine Agreement and Broadcast
Security Problem
Communication
Complexity
Input range l
to reach optimality
Reference
crypto.
reliable broadcast
agreement
O(nl + B(k) + kn2)
O(nl +A(k) + kn2)
Ω(kn)
Ω(kn)
This paper
This paper
error-free
reliable broadcast
reliable broadcast
agreement
agreement
O(nl + n2 log nB(1))
O(nl + nB(1) + n3 log n)
O(nl + n3 log nB(1) + nA(1))
O(nl + n2B(1) + nA(1) + n4 log n)
Ω(n3 log n)
Ω(n2 log n)
Ω(n4 log n)
Ω(n3 log n)
[27, 18]
This paper
[27, 18]
This paper
Table 2: Extension Protocols for Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement and Reliable Broadcast under
t < n/3
2 Related Work
Timing and setup assumptions. With different security assumptions on the adversary and
timing assumptions, Byzantine broadcast and agreement can be solved for different thresholds of
the Byzantine parties. For the timing assumptions, protocols under both synchrony and asynchrony
have been studied. If a trusted setup like public-key infrastructure (PKI) exists, it is called the
authenticated setting; otherwise, it is the unauthenticated setting.
• In the synchronous setting, BB/BA can be solved under t < n/3 without authentication [21].
With authentication, BA can be solved under t < n/2 and BB can be solved under t < n
[21, 14, 28].
• In the asynchronous setting, BB is impossible; BA (randomized) and reliable broadcast can
be solved under t < n/3 with or without authentication [8, 9].
The authenticated protocols in this paper are cryptographically secure, in which case the adversary
is assumed to be computationally bounded and unable to comprise the cryptographic tools involved;
the unauthenticated protocols in this paper are error-free.
Previous extension protocols. Table 1 summarizes the most related extension protocols in
the synchronous setting. Here we describe the protocols in Table 1 and mention several other exten-
sion protocols. Let kh denote output size of the collision-resistant hash function. For both Byzantine
broadcast and agreement in the synchronous setting under t < n/2, recent work proposes authen-
ticated algorithms with communication cost O(nl+nB(kh)+n3kh) [17, 18]. For the authenticated
setting when t < n, the state-of-the-art BB extension protocols have communication complexity
O(nl+B(nkh)+n2B(n log n)) [17, 18]. Recent work also proposes authenticated extension protocols
with information-theoretic security [16, 11]; these protocols have worse communication complexity
than cryptographic ones. For the unauthenticated setting with t < n/3, existing works mostly
focus error-free protocols. Liang and Vaidya [22] propose the first optimal error-free Byzantine
broadcast and agreement protocol with communication complexity O(nl+(n2
√
l+n4)B(1)) for the
synchronous case. Patra [27] improves the communication complexity to O(nl + n2B(1)).
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Table 2 summarizes the most related extension protocols in the asynchronous setting. The error-
free unauthenticated protocol of Patra [27] can be adapted to asynchrony to solve reliable broadcast
and asynchronous BA; the communication complexity for reliable broadcast is O(nl+n2 log nB(1)),
and O(nl + n3 log nB(1) + nA(1)) for BA. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no extension
protocols in the authenticated and asynchronous setting. Of course, Patra’s unauthenticated pro-
tocol can be used in the authenticated setting, but the cost would be much higher than our new
protocols. Cachin and Tessaro [10] adapt Bracha’s broadcast [8] to handle l-bit long messages with
communication cost O(nl + khn
2 log n), but their method does not seem to generalize to other
protocols and hence does not yield an extension protocol.
State-of-the-art oracle schemes. To better interpret the improvements we obtained for ex-
tension protocols, we provide a summary of the state-of-the-art broadcast and agreement protocols
that can be used as the oracle in our extension protocol. For the synchronous setting, we focus
on deterministic solutions in this paper. The best solution to authenticated BB for t < n is the
classic Dolev-Strong [14] protocol. After applying multi-signatures, the communication complexity
to broadcast (up to) k bits is B(1) = B(k) = Θ((k + ks)n2 + n3) where ks is the signature size.
The Dolev-Strong protocol can also be modified to solve authenticated BA for the t < n/2 case
(BA is impossible if t ≥ n/2). Using an initial all-to-all round with threshold signature to simulate
the sender, the communication complexity remains as A(1) = A(k) = Θ((k + ks)n2 + n3). In the
unauthenticated setting, only t < n/3 Byzantine parties can be tolerated and Berman et al. [5]
achieves B(1) = A(1) = Θ(n2) (when t = Θ(n)), matching the lower bound on communication
complexity.
In the asynchronous setting, Bracha’s reliable broadcast [8] is deterministic and has commu-
nication complexity B(1) = O(n2). Randomization is necessary for asynchronous BA given the
FLP impossibility [15]. State-of-art protocols rely on a “common coin” oracle to provide shared
randomness but are deterministic otherwise. The most efficient unauthenticated asynchronous BA
[25] achieves expected communication complexity A(1) = O(n2) assuming a magic common coin
oracle. The most efficient authenticated asynchronous BA [2] achieves expected communication
complexity A(1) = A(k) = O(kn2) and provides a construction for the common coin oracle.
3 Preliminaries
We consider n parties P1, ..., Pn connected by a reliable, authenticated all-to-all network, where up
to t parties may be corrupted by an adversary A and behave in a Byzantine fashion. All the results
in the main paper consider the synchronous model, where there exists a known upper bound on
the message delay and computation delay, and some results can be extended to asynchrony (in
Appendix C.1 and C.2) where such upper bounds do not exist. We consider a static adversary
which decides the set of corrupted parties at the beginning of the execution. We denote parties
that are not corrupted by the adversary as honest parties. Two types of the adversary are consid-
ered. The computationally bounded adversary, considered in cryptographically secure protocols, is
restricted on some computational assumptions such as cryptographic accumulators and public key
infrastructure (introduced in Section 4.1 later). On the other hand, the computationally unbounded
adversary is considered in the error-free protocols. The communication complexity [31] of the pro-
tocol is measured by the worst-case or expected number of bits transmitted by the honest parties
according to the protocol specification over all possible executions under any adversary strategy.
Here, we provide the formal definition of Byzantine broadcast (BB) and Byzantine agreement (BA).
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Definition 1 (Byzantine Broadcast). A protocol for a set of parties P = {P1, ..., Pn}, where a
distinguished party called the sender Ps ∈ P holds an initial l-bit input m, is a Byzantine broadcast
protocol tolerating an adversary A, if the following properties hold
• Termination. Every honest party eventually outputs a message.
• Agreement. All the honest parties output the same message.
• Validity. If the sender is honest, all honest parties output the message m.
Definition 2 (Byzantine Agreement). A protocol for a set of parties P = {P1, ..., Pn}, where
each party Pi ∈ P holds an initial l-bit input mi, is a Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating an
adversary A, if the following properties hold
• Termination. Every honest party eventually outputs a message.
• Agreement. All the honest parties output the same message.
• Validity. If every honest party Pi holds the same input message m, then all honest parties
output the message m.
We introduce two basic tools we will use.
Linear Error Correcting Code [29]. We will use standard Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [29]
in our protocols, which is a (n, b) RS code in Galois Field F = GF (2a) with n ≤ 2a − 1. This code
encodes b data symbols from GF (2a) into codewords of n symbols from GF (2a), and can decode
the codewords to recover the original data.
• ENC. Given inputsm1, ...,mb, an encoding function ENC computes (s1, ..., sn) = ENC(m1, ...,mb),
where (s1, ..., sn) are codewords of length n. By the property of the RS code, knowledge of
any b elements of the codeword uniquely determines the input message and the remaining of
the codeword.
• DEC. The function DEC computes (m1, ...,mb) = DEC(s1, ..., sn), and is capable of tolerating
up to c errors and d erasures in codewords (s1, ..., sn), if and only if n − b ≥ 2c + d. In our
protocol, We will invoke DEC with specific values of c, d satisfying the above relation, and DEC
will return correct output.
Multi-signature Scheme [7]. Multi-signature scheme can aggregate n signatures into one
signature, therefore reduce the size of signatures. Given n signatures σi = Sign(ski,m) on the
same message m with corresponding public keys pki for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a multi-signature scheme can
combine the n signatures above into one signature Σ where |Σ| = |σi|. The combined signature can
be verified by anyone using a verification function Ver(PK,Σ,m,L), where L is the list of signers
and PK is the union of n public keys pki.
4 Cryptographically Secure Extension Protocols under t < n/2
Faults
In this section, we consider the computationally bounded adversary, which is restricted on compu-
tational assumptions such as the cryptographic accumulator and public-key infrastructure. Under
such assumption, we design cryptographically secure extension protocols with improved communi-
cation complexity. Recall that we use k to denote the size of all cryptographic primitives used in
the extension protocol (see Section 1).
For t < n/2, we propose an extension protocol for synchronous Byzantine agreement with
communication complexity O(nl + A(k) + kn2). A similar extension protocol for synchronous
Byzantine broadcast has communication complexity O(nl + B(k) +A(1) + kn2).
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The above protocols are adapted to asynchronous Byzantine agreement and reliable broadcast
under t < n/3 in Appendix C.
4.1 Building Blocks: Encode, Distribute and Reconstruct
In this section, we define several subprotocols that will be used in our extension protocols in Section
4.2 and 5. In addition to the linear error correcting code introduced in Section 3, the subprotocols
also use a cryptographic tool called accumulator defined as follows.
Cryptographic Accumulators [3, 12]. We present the definition of cryptographic accumu-
lators proposed by Baric´ and Pfitzmann [3]. Intuitively, the cryptographic accumulator constructs
an accumulation value for a set of values and can produce a witness for each value in the set.
Given the accumulation value and a witness, any party can verify if a value is indeed in the set.
Formally, given a parameter k, and a set D of n values d1, ..., dn, an accumulator has the following
components:
• Gen(1k, n): This algorithm takes a parameter k represented in unary form 1k and an accu-
mulation threshold n (an upper bound on the number of values that can be accumulated
securely), returns an accumulator key ak. The accumulator key ak is part of the trusted
setup and therefore is public to all parties.
• Eval(ak,D): This algorithm takes an accumulator key ak and a set D of values to be accu-
mulated, returns an accumulation value z for the value set D.
• CreateWit(ak, z, di): This algorithm takes an accumulator key ak, an accumulation value z
for D and a value di, returns ⊥ if di /∈ D, and a witness wi if di ∈ D.
• Verify(ak, z, wi, di): This algorithm takes an accumulator key ak, an accumulation value z
for D, a witness wi and a value di, returns true if wi is the witness for di ∈ D, and false
otherwise.
In our extension protocols, the input message is encoded as a set of values, and the cryptographic
accumulator is used for verifying the correctness of the values received from other parties. Note that
for simplicity, our definition of the cryptographic accumulator above omits the auxiliary information
aux that appears in the standard definition [3] because the the bilinear accumulator we will use (in
Appendix A) does not use aux. We also assume that the function Eval is deterministic, since the
bilinear accumulator implementation has a deterministic construction. The bilinear accumulator
satisfies the following properties.
Lemma 1 (Collision-free accumulator [26]). The bilinear accumulator is collision-free. That is,
for any set size n, there is only a probability negligible in k. for a probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary to find an accumulator key ak, a set D = {d1, ..., dn}, an accumulation value z for D, a
value d′ /∈ D, and a witness w′ such that Verify(ak, z, w′, d′) = true.
Corollary 1. The bilinear accumulator satisfies that, for any set size n, there is only a probability
negligible in k for a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary to find two sets D 6= D′ that have the
same accumulation value.
Explanation of the building blocks. Now we define three subprotocols Encode, Distribute and
Reconstruct that will be used as building blocks for our extension protocols, listed in Figure 1.
• Encode first divides a message m into b blocks, then compute n coded values (s1, ..., sn) using
RS codes (defined in Section 3), and attaches an index j for each value sj. The purpose of
Encode is to introduce resilience by encoding the message into fault-tolerant coded values –
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• Encode(m, b)
Input: a message m, a number b
Output: n coded values s1, ..., sn
Divide m into b blocks evenly, m1, ...,mb, each has l/b bits where l is the length of m.
Compute (s1, ..., sn) = ENC(m1, ...,mb) using RS codes, where ENC is defined in Section
4.1. Add an index to every value in (s1, ..., sn), i.e., D = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉), and return
D.
• Distribute(D, ak, z)
Input: a set of indexed values D = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉), an accumulator key ak, an
accumulation value z
Compute wj = CreateWit(ak, z, 〈j, sj〉) for every 〈j, sj〉 ∈ D. Send (sj, wj) to party Pj
for every j ∈ [n].
• Reconstruct(S, ak, z, d0)
Input: S = ((〈1, s1〉, w1), ..., (〈n, sn〉, wn)) where each (〈i, si〉, wi) is a pair of indexed
value and witness, an accumulator key ak, an accumulation value z, a number d0
Output: a message m
For every j ∈ [n], if Verify(ak, z′, wj , 〈j, sj〉) = false, let sj = ⊥. Apply DEC on the
codewords (s1, ..., sn) with c = 0 and d = d0, where DEC is defined in Section 4.1. Return
m = m1|...|mb where m1, ...,mb are the data returned by DEC.
Figure 1: Building Blocks
after applying Encode to a message m, even if n− b coded values in (s1, ..., sn) are erasured,
one can recover the message from the remaining coded values.
• Distribute computes a witness wj for each indexed value 〈j, sj〉 in the input set, and sends the
j-th value with its witness to party j. The purpose of Distribute is to distribute the values
in a robust yet efficient manner – if at least one honest party that has the correct message
m (the accumulation value z of m is correct) invokes Distribute, then it is guaranteed that
any honest party j receives and accepts the j-th value sj of m, thanks to the witness wj sent
together with the value.
• Reconstruct first removes any invalid value sj that cannot be verified by witness wj and the
accumulation value z, and then decode the message m using RS code (defined in Section 3)
from the remaining values with at most d0 values being removed. The purpose of Reconstruct
is to recover the message, despite the presence of at most d0 corruptions in the value, which
will be detected by the accumulator scheme and thus erasured.
Our extension protocols in Section 4 and 5 will use Encode at the beginning of the protocol to encode
the input message to coded values, use Distribute in the middle to let every party distribute their
coded values with the witnesses, and use Reconstruct to reconstruct the original input message
after receiving the coded values.
Lemma 2. For any message m, let z = Eval(ak, Encode(m, b)). The adversary cannot generate
m′ such that m′ 6= m and z = Eval(ak, Encode(m′, b)) with non-negligible probability in k.
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Input of every party Pi: An l-bit message mi
Primitive: Byzantine agreement oracle, cryptographic accumulator with Eval, CreateWit,
Verify
Protocol for party Pi:
1. Compute Di = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉) = Encode(mi, b). Compute the accumulation value
zi = Eval(ak,Di). Input zi to an instance of k-bit Byzantine agreement oracle.
2. When the above BA outputs z, if z = zi, set happyi = 1, otherwise set happyi = 0.
Input happyi to an instance of 1-bit Byzantine agreement oracle.
3. • If the above BA outputs 0, output oi = ⊥ and abort.
• If the above BA outputs 1 and happyi = 1, invoke Distribute(Di, ak, z).
4. For the set of pairs {(si, wi)} received from the previous step, if there exists a (si, wi)
pair such that Verify(ak, z, wi, 〈i, si〉) = true, then send (si, wi) to all other parties.
5. If happyi = 1, set oi = mi. Otherwise, let (sj , wj) be the message received from
party Pj from the previous step and Si = ((〈1, s1〉, w1), ..., (〈n, sn〉, wn)), and set oi =
Reconstruct(Si, ak, z, t).
6. Output oi.
Figure 2: Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BA
Proof. For anym′ such that z = Eval(ak, Encode(m′, b)), let D = Encode(m, b) andD′ = Encode(m′, b).
According to Corollary 1, the adversary cannot find D′ 6= D that have the same accumulation value
with non-negligible probability in k. Therefore the same accumulation value implies that the two
accumulated sets are identical, that is, D = D′. By the RS code, the same codewords correspond
to the same message, and thus m = m′.
4.2 Byzantine Agreement under < n
2
faults
Without loss of generality, we assume the number of Byzantine parties is t = ⌊n−12 ⌋ = ⌈n2 ⌉ − 1 in
this section. Let b = n− t = ⌊n2 ⌋+ 1.
The protocol is presented in Figure 2. We briefly describe each step of Protocol Synchronous
Crypto. n2 -BA. First each party encodes its message using RS codes and computes the accumulation
value for the set of coded values. With a deterministic Eval, any honest party with the same
accumulator key and set will produce the same accumulation value. The RS codes can recover the
message with up to t coded values being erasured, and the accumulation value uniquely corresponds
to the set of coded values (by Corollary 1) and equivalently the original message. Then every
party runs an instance of k-bit Byzantine agreement with the accumulation value as the input.
After the above agreement terminates, each party checks whether the agreement output matches
its accumulation value, and inputs the result to an 1-bit Byzantine agreement instance. If the
above agreement outputs 0, then no honest party has a message corresponding to an accumulation
value matching the agreement output z, therefore all parties output ⊥ and abort. If the above
agreement outputs 1, then at least one honest party has the accumulation value zi matching with
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the agreement output z, and every honest party will agree on the message corresponding to z.
Then in Distribute, all parties send the j-th coded value to party Pj. After that, each honest
party Pj will send a valid j-th coded value to all other parties, from which the correct message
can be obtained in Reconstruct. One nice property of our protocol is that, if at least one honest
party with message m invokes Distribute, then all honest parties can obtain m from Reconstruct
(see the proof of Lemma 4). We prove the validity and agreement and properties and analyze the
communication complexity below.
Lemma 3. If every honest party has the same input message mi = m, all honest parties output
the same message m.
Proof. If all honest parties have the same input message mi = m, they compute and input the
same accumulation value z to the instance of Byzantine agreement in step 1. Then in step 2, the
BA outputs z by the validity condition, and any honest party sets happyi = 1. Therefore, every
honest party Pi inputs 1 to the 1-bit Byzantine agreement oracle in step 2. By the validity of the
Byzantine agreement oracle, the agreement will output 1. Then any honest party Pi sets oi = m
in step 5 since happyi = 1. Hence, all honest parties output m when the protocol terminates.
Lemma 4. All honest parties output the same message.
Proof. If the Byzantine agreement in step 3 outputs 0, then all honest parties output the same
message ⊥. If the agreement agreement in step 3 outputs 1, then by the validity of the Byzantine
agreement, some honest party Pi must input 1 and thus has zi = z. By Lemma 2, any honest party
Pi with happyi = 1 has the identical message m corresponding to z, and sets the output to be m at
step 5. In step 3, any honest party Pi with happyi = 1 invokes Distribute to compute witness wj
for each index value 〈j, sj〉, and sends the valid (sj, wj) pair computed from message m to party Pj
for every Pj . By Lemma 1, the Byzantine parties cannot generate a different pair (s
′
j, w
′
j) that can
be verified. Therefore, in step 4, every honest party Pj receives at least one valid (sj , wj) pair, and
forwards it to all other parties. Since there are at least n− t honest parties, in step 5, each honest
party will receive at least n− t valid coded values. In Reconstruct, using the accumulation value
associated with the coded value, any party Pi can detect the corrupted values and remove them.
By the property of RS codes, since n− b = t ≥ 2c+ d = t, any honest party Pi with happyi = 0 is
able to recover the message m, and any honest party Pi with happyi = 1 already has the message
m. Therefore all honest parties outputs m.
Theorem 1. Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BA satisfies Termination, Agreement and Validity,
and has communication complexity O(nl+A(k) + kn2).
Proof. Termination is clearly satisfied. By Lemma 4, agreement is satisfied. By Lemma 3, validity
is satisfied.
Step 1 has cost O(nl + A(k)), where k is the size of the cryptographic accumulator. Step 2
has cost A(1) ≤ A(k). Step 3 has cost O(nl + kn2), since each honest party invokes an instance
of Distribute, which leads to an all-to-all communication with each message of size O(l/b+ k) =
O(l/n + k). For step 4, it also has cost O(nl + kn2) similarly as step 3. Hence the total cost is
O(nl +A(k) + kn2).
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4.3 Lower Bound on BA for Long Messages
We start by showing a straightforward lower bound of Ω(nl + A(k) + n2) for l-bit BA as follows.
First of all, Ω(nl) is a lower bound for Byzantine agreement protocol with l-bit inputs according
to [16]. We briefly mention the proof idea from [16] for completeness. Let a set A of n− t parties
have input m and a set B of the rest t parties have input m′ 6= m. In scenario 1, let parties
in B be Byzantine but behave as if they are honest. Then by the validity condition, all parties
in A will output m. In scenario 2, let parties in B be honest. To parties in A, the scenario 2 is
indistinguishable from scenario 1, and thus they will outputm. By the agreement condition, parties
in B also need to output m. Therefore each party in B needs to learn the message m, which leads
to a lower bound on the communication cost of Ω(tl) = Ω(nl). Secondly, since A(m) denotes the
communication complexity of a BA oracle with m-bit inputs, it is clear that A(k) is a lower bound
for l ≥ k. Finally, according to [13], Ω(n2) is a lower bound on the communication complexity for
any Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating t = Θ(n) faults. The above lower bounds together
imply a lower bound of Ω(nl +A(k) + n2) for l-bit BA.
By Theorem 1, our Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BA has cost O(nl + A(k) + kn2), which
is very close to the lower bound. Although it does not meet the lower bound, we remark that
further improvements seem challenging. Notice that if A(k) = Ω(kn2), then a lower bound of
Ω(nl +A(k) + kn2) follows, matching our upper bound. Thus, improving upon our upper bound
requires a k-bit BA oracle whose communication complexity is o(kn2). In fact, if we were to design
such a more efficient BA protocol, we have to follow a very particular paradigm. The Ω(n2) lower
bound by Dolev and Reischuk is a lower bound on the number of messages [13]. If every message
is signed, then Ω(kn2) communication must be incurred. Yet, we know authentication is necessary
for tolerating minority faults. Thus, such a protocol must use Ω(n2) messages in total but only
authenticate a small subset of them. We are not aware of any work exploring this direction, and
closing this gap is an interesting open problem. For reference, as mentioned in Section 2, the
state-of-the-art BA with minority faults has a communication complexity of A(k) = Θ(kn2 + n3).
4.4 Byzantine Broadcast under t < n/2
The extension protocol for synchronous Byzantine broadcast under < n2 is very similar to that of
synchronous Byzantine agreement, as presented in Figure 3. The main difference is that the sender
uses a k-bit Byzantine broadcast oracle to broadcast its accumulation value, instead of every party
inputting its accumulation value to a k-bit Byzantine agreement oracle.
Lemma 5. If the sender is honest and has input ms, all honest parties output the same message
ms.
Proof. If the sender is honest, every honest party will receive ms and the Byzantine broadcast
outputs the corresponding accumulation value zs. Then in step 2, any honest party Pi computes a
matching accumulation value zi = zs with ms, sets happyi = 1 and inputs 1 to an 1-bit Byzantine
agreement oracle. By the validity of the Byzantine agreement, the agreement will output 1. Then
any honest party Pi sets oi = m in step 5 since happyi = 1. Hence, all honest parties output m
when the protocol terminates.
Lemma 6. All honest parties output the same message.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 4.
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Input of the sender Ps: An l-bit message ms
Primitive: Byzantine broadcast oracle, Byzantine agreement oracle, cryptographic accumula-
tor with Eval, CreateWit, Verify
Protocol for party Pi:
1. If i = s, perform the following. Compute Ds = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉) = Encode(ms, e).
Compute the accumulation value zs = Eval(ak,Ds). Send ms to every party, and
broadcast zs by invoking a k-bit Byzantine broadcast oracle.
2. When receiving the message m from the sender, and the Byzantine broadcast above
output z, perform the following. Compute Di = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉) = Encode(m, e).
Compute the accumulation value zi = Eval(ak,Di). If zi = z, set happyi = 1, otherwise
set happyi = 0. Input happyi to an instance of single-bit Byzantine agreement oracle.
3. Steps 3 to 6 are identical to that of Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BA.
Figure 3: Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BB
Theorem 2. Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BB satisfies Termination, Agreement and Validity.
The protocol has communication complexity O(nl + B(k) +A(1) + kn2).
Proof. Termination is clearly satisfied. By Lemma 6, agreement is satisfied. By Lemma 5, validity
is satisfied.
Step 1 has cost O(nl + B(k)), where k is the size of the cryptographic accumulator. Step 2
has cost O(A(1)). Step 3 has cost O(nl + kn2), since each honest party invokes an instance of
Distribute, which leads to an all-to-all communication with each message of size O(l/b + k) =
O(l/n+ k). For step 4, it also has cost O(nl+ kn2). Hence the total cost is O(nl+ B(k) +A(1) +
kn2).
5 Cryptographically Secure Extension Protocol under t < (1− ε)n
Faults
In this section, we propose an extension protocol for synchronous BB with communication com-
plexity O(nl+B(k)+kn2+n3) under t < (1−ε)n where ε > 0 is some constant. Our protocol does
not achieve the best fault tolerance of t < n as state-of-art solutions [17, 18] did, but it is much
more efficient than state-of-art solutions. Also note that BA is impossible under t ≥ n/2 faults even
with authentication [21]. Without loss of generality, we assume the number of Byzantine parties is
t = ⌊(1− ε)(n − 1)⌋ in this section. Let b = n− t.
Protocol Synchronous Crypto. (1− ε)n-BB. The protcol is presented in Figure 4, and we briefly
explain each step of the protocol. First the sender encodes its message and computes the accu-
mulation value using the coded values. Then the sender broadcasts the accumulation value via
an instance of k-bit Byzantine broadcast oracle. By the agreement condition, all honest replicas
output the same value for BB. The remaining of the protocol runs in iterations r = 1, 2, ..., t + 1.
Each iteration consists 3 steps. The Distribution step, Sharing step and Reconstruction step are
analogous to steps 3− 5 in Protocol Scynhronous Crypto. n2 -BA in Figure 2, but here each step is
examined in every iteration for execution, and is executed only once. The Distribution step aims to
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Input of the sender Ps: An l-bit message ms
Primitive: Byzantine broadcast oracle, cryptographic accumulator with Eval, CreateWit,
Verify
Protocol for party Pi:
1. The sender Ps initializes os = ms, happys = 1, and other party Pi initializes oi =
⊥, happyi = 0. The sender computes Ds = Encode(ms, b), the accumulator value zs =
Eval(ak,Ds), and broadcasts zs by invoking an instance of k-bit Byzantine broadcast
oracle. Let zi denote the output of the Byzantine broadcast at party Pi.
2. For iterations r = 1, ..., t + 1:
Distribution step:
If happyi = 1, then sign the HAPPY message using the multi-signature scheme,
send the multi-signature signed by r distinct parties to all other parties, invoke
Distribute(Di, ak, zi), and skip the Distribution step in all future iterations.
Sharing step:
If a valid (si, wi) pair is received from the Distribution step such that
Verify(ak, zi, wi, 〈i, si〉) = true, then send (si, wi) to all other parties and skip the
Sharing step in all future iterations.
Reconstruction step: (not a communication step)
Let (sj , wj) be the first message received from party Pj from the Sharing step (possibly
from previous iterations). Let Si = ((〈1, s1〉, w1), ..., (〈n, sn〉, wn)). Compute Mi =
Reconstruct(Si, ak, zi, t) and Di = Encode(Mi, b). If Eval(ak,Di) = zi and a HAPPY
message signed by r distinct parties excluding Pi was received in the Distribution step
of this iteration, then set happyi = 1, set oi = Mi, and skip the Reconstruction step in
all future iterations.
3. Output oi.
Figure 4: Protocol Synchronous Crypto. (1− ε)-BB
distribute the indexed coded values to other parties. The Sharing step forwards the correct coded
value to other parties. The Reconstruction step aims to reconstruct the original message from
the coded values received from other parties and set the output. Similar to Protocol Scynhronous
Crypto. n2 -BA, the above steps provide a nice guarantee that if at least one honest party with
message m invokes Distribute in the Distribution step, then all honest parties can obtain m in
the Reconstruction step (see the proof of Lemma 7).
Now we give a more detailed description. A party becomes happy (i.e., sets happyi = 1) if
it is ready to output a message that is not ⊥. In the first iteration, only the sender is happy; it
invokes Distribute and also signs and sends a message HAPPY of a constant size. The role of the
message HAPPY is to be signed by the rest of the parties using multi-signatures to form a signature
chain, similar to the Dolve-Strong Byzantine broadcast algorithm [14]. An honest party becomes
happy at the end of iteration r, if it reconstructs the correct message (matching the agreed upon
accumulation value) in the Reconstruction step of iteration r and has received a HAPPY message
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signed by r parties in the Distribution step of iteration r. When an honest party becomes happy,
it will set its output to be the reconstructed message Mi; then, in the Distribution step of the next
iteration (if there is one), it will also send its own signature of HAPPY to all other parties, and invoke
Distribute. This way, if an honest party becomes happy in the last iteration r = t+ 1, it can be
assured that some honest party has invoked Distribute, so that all honest parties will be ready
to output the correct message. We reiterate that each step is executed at most once in the entire
protocol. Finally, after t+ 1 iterations, every party outputs the message.
Lemma 7. If any honest party Pi invokes Distribute with message m, then every honest party
Pj outputs oj = m.
Proof. By the agreement condition of the Byzantine broadcast, the output zi of the BB at every
honest party Pi is identical. If an honest party Pi invokes Distribute with message m, m satisfies
zi = Eval(ak, Encode(m, b)). If any other honest party Pj sets oj = m
′ after initialization, it must
satisfy Eval(ak, Encode(m′, b)) = zj = zi. By Lemma 2, m = m
′. Thus, we only need to show that
every other honest party Pj sets oj.
Suppose that Pi invokes Distribute in some iteration r. According to the subprotocol Distribute,
Pi computes a witness wj for each indexed value 〈j, sj〉 and sends the pair (sj , wj) to each party
Pj . According to Lemma 1, the adversary cannot generate d
′ /∈ Di and a witness w′ such that
Verify(ak, zi, w
′, d′) = true. Then, in Sharing step of iteration r, every honest party Pj can
identify and forward the valid pair (sj , wj) to all other parties, unless it has already done that in
previous iterations. Since there are at least n− t = b honest parties, in the Reconstruction step of
iteration r, every honest party Pj receives at least n− t = b correct coded values. In Reconstruct,
using the witness associated with the indexed coded value, every party Pj can identify the corrupted
values and remove them. The number of erased values is at most t. By the property of RS codes,
since n− b ≥ 2c+ d = t, Pj with happyj = 0 is able to recover the message m.
Furthermore, we will show that each party will receive a HAPPY message signed by r distinct
parties in the Reconstruction step of iteration r. If r = 1, then Pi = Ps and every Pj will receive
a signature for HAPPY. If r > 1, then Pi has received a multi-signature of HAPPY signed by r − 1
distinct parties excluding Pi in the Reconstruction step of iteration r−1; Pi adds its own signature
of HAPPY in iteration r, so each honest Pj will receive a multi-signature of HAPPY signed by r distinct
parties in the Reconstruction step of iteration r.
Therefore, if happyj = 0 up till now, then an honest Pj will set happyj = 1 and oj = m in
the Reconstruction step of iteration r. If happyj = 1, then Pj has already set oj = m. Note
that an honest sender does not set its output again in the Reconstruction step, since the HAPPY
message always contains its signature. Once Pj sets oj, it will skip the Reconstruction step in all
future iterations, and oj will not be changed. Therefore, all honest parties output m when they
terminate.
Lemma 8. If the sender is honest and has input ms, every honest party outputs ms.
Proof. If the sender is honest and has input ms, in step 1 it computes and broadcasts the accumu-
lation value zs. In iteration r = 1, the sender sends a signed HAPPY to all other parties and invokes
Distribute. By Lemma 7, every honest parties output ms.
Lemma 9. Every honest party outputs the same message.
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Proof. If all honest parties output ⊥, then the lemma is true. Otherwise, suppose some honest
party Pi outputs oi = m where m 6= ⊥. If Pi is the sender, then by Lemma 8, all honest parties
output m. Now consider the case where Pi is not the sender. According to the protocol, if Pi 6= Ps
sets oi = m 6= ⊥ in the Reconstruction step of iteration 1 ≤ r ≤ t, Pi will invoke Distribute with
m in iteration r+ 1. By Lemma 7, all honest parties output m. If the honest party Pi sets oi = m
in iteration r = t+1, according to the protocol, Pi receives a HAPPY signed by t+1 distinct parties.
Since there are at most t Byzantine parties, there exists at least one honest party Pj 6= Pi that
has signed HAPPY and invoked Distribute with oj = m
′ in a previous iteration 1 ≤ r′ ≤ t. Then,
by Lemma 7, all honest parties including Pi output m
′. Therefore, m′ = m, and all honest parties
output m.
Theorem 3. Protocol Synchronous Crypto. (1 − ε)n-BB satisfies Termination, Agreement and
Validity. The protocol has communication complexity O(nl + B(k) + kn2 + n3).
Proof. Termination is clearly satisfied. By Lemma 9, agreement is satisfied. By Lemma 8, validity
is satisfied.
Step 1 has cost B(k) for the k-bit BB oracle. The Distribution step has total communication
cost O(nl+ kn2 + n3), since each honest party executes the Distribution step at most once, where
invoking Distribute has cost O(l+kn), and sending the signed HAPPYmessage has cost O((k+n)n)
where the (k + n) term is due to the signature size and the list of signers in the multi-signature
scheme. The Sharing step is also performed at most once for every honest party, and has total cost
O(nl + kn2) since each honest party in the Sharing step sends a message of size O(l/n + k) to all
other parties. The Reconstruction step has no communication cost. Hence, the total communication
complexity is O(nl+ B(k) + kn2 + n3).
Optimality with the current best BB oracle. By Theorem 3, our Protocol Synchronous Crypto.
(1 − ε)n-BB has communication complexity O(nl + B(k) + kn2 + n3). From Section 2, the classic
Dolev-Strong [14] protocol is the best solution for BB, with cost B(k) = Θ((k+ks)n2+n3) for k-bit
inputs where ks is the signature size. Assuming Θ(ks) = Θ(k), then our protocol is optimal with
the current best BB oracle, since any extension protocol cannot have communication cost better
than O(nl + kn2 + n3) unless BB protocol better than the Dolev-Strong protocol is proposed.
6 Error-free Extension Protocols under t < n3 Faults
In this section, we present improved error-free extension protocols for synchronous Byzantine agree-
ment/broadcast. Error-free extension protocols for the asynchronous case are presented in Ap-
pendix C.2. We consider computationally unbounded adversary in this section. Without loss of
generality, we assume the number of Byzantine parties is t = ⌊n−13 ⌋ in this section.
For error-free multi-valued synchronous Byzantine agreement, the state-of-art extension proto-
col has communication complexity O(nl+n2B(1)) = O(nl+n4) [27, 18]. Here, we propose a protocol
under the same setting with improved communication complexity O(nl+n3+nB(1)) = O(nl+n3).
For l ≥ O(n2), our protocol is optimal in communication complexity, and for l ≤ O(n2), our pro-
tocol has communication cost O(n3), which is better than the previous work [27, 18] by a factor of
n. For the synchronous case, Byzantine broadcast can be constructed from Byzantine agreement
with the same asymptotic communication complexity, by first letting the sender send the message
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1. Let G = (P, E) be the input graph. Let H = G = (P, E) be the complementary graph
of G. Find a maximum matching in H using any deterministic algorithm such as [6].
Let M be the matching and N be the set of matched nodes. Let N = P\N .
2. Compute output as follows:
2.1. Find the set T = {Pi ∈ N | ∃Pj, Pk s.t. (Pj , Pk) ∈ M and (Pi, Pj), (Pi, Pk) ∈ E}.
Let C = N\T .
2.2. Find the set B ⊆ N of matched nodes that have neighbors in C in H. That is,
B = {Pj ∈ N | ∃Pk ∈ C s.t. (Pj , Pk) ∈ E}. Let D = P\B.
2.3. If |C| ≥ 2n− t and |D| ≥ n− t, output (C,D). Otherwise, output noSTAR.
Figure 5: Protocol STAR
to all parties and then perform a Byzantine agreement to reach agreement [23]. Therefore, we only
present the Byzantine agreement protocol.
Building Block: STAR protocol [4]. The following building block is adopted from [18]. A sub-
protocol (Figure 5) called STAR [4] is used to find an (n, t)-star in a given undirected graph.
Definition 3 ((n, t)-star [4]). For a given undirected graph G = (P, E), an (n, t)-star is a pair
(C,D) of sets with C ⊆ D ⊆ P that satisfies
1. |C| ≥ n− 2t, |D| ≥ n− t
2. There exists an edge (Pi, Pj) ∈ E for ∀Pi ∈ C, Pj ∈ D
Another tool that we will use is the Linear Error Correcting Code introduced in Section 4.1.
Protocol Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA. Now we present an improved extension protocol for error-
free multi-valued synchronous Byzantine agreement when t < n/3, as presented in Figure 6.
The algorithm is inspired by the error-free protocol from [27, 18], and has a similar structure.
Here we briefly describe each step of the protocol. Initially, each party divides and encodes its
message into n blocks via RS code, and sends blocks to the corresponding party. Then each party
compares its block and the block received from others, and constructs a vector to record whether
the corresponding blocks are identical. After all the parties exchange their vectors, each party Pi
constructs a graph Gi from which a set Ei of parties is derived. Then each party Pi broadcasts
whether it has successfully obtained Ei, and sends Ei to all other parties. When there are enough
parties successfully obtaining the set, each honest party can extract a correct piece of codewords
maj and send to others. From all the codewords received, each honest party is able to reconstruct
the message and thus reach an agreement.
Comparing to the protocol in [27, 18], the novelty of our protocol is that, instead of every
party Pi broadcasting a length n vector vi via Byzantine broadcast in step 2 which will result in
communication complexity O(n2B(1)) = O(n4), we only let each party to send the vector to all other
parties and thus reduce the cost to O(n3). As a result, different parties may receive different vectors
from the Byzantine parties, which leads to different constructions of set Ci,Di,Fi, Ei at different
party Pi instead of the identical sets C,D,F , E at all parties as in Protocol n3 -BA from [27, 18].
How to resolve such conflicting information and still obtain useful information to reconstruct an
identical message at all honest parties is the main contribution of our protocol. The observation
15
Input of every party pi: An l-bit message mi
Primitive: Broadcast oracle for a single bit, STAR
Protocol for party Pi:
1. Divide the l-bit message mi into t + 1 blocks, mi0, · · · ,mit, each has l/(t + 1) bits.
Compute (si1, · · · , sin) = ENC(mi0, · · · ,mit). Send sii to every party. Send sij to Pj for
j = 1, · · · , n.
2. Construct a binary vector vi of length n. Assign vi[j] = 1, if sij = sjj and sii = sji
where sjj and sji are received from Pj . Otherwise assign vi[j] = 0. Send vi to every
party.
3. Construct an undirected graph Gi with parties in P as vertices, and add an edge (Px, Py)
if vx[y] = vy[x] = 1. Invoke STAR(Gi).
4. If (Ci,Di) is returned by STAR, find Fi of size at least 2t + 1 as the set of parties who
have at least t + 1 neighbours in Ci in graph Gi, and find Ei of size at least 2t + 1 as
the set of parties who have at least 2t+ 1 neighbours in Fi in graph Gi. Any party Pj
is viewed as its neighbor for the purpose of finding Ei. Obtain the set Ei as above if
possible, otherwise let Ei = ∅.
5. Broadcast a single bit of 1 using the single-bit Byzantine broadcast primitive if Ei 6= ∅.
Send Ei as an n-bit vector to every party. Otherwise, broadcast a single bit of 0 using
the single-bit Byzantine broadcast primitive.
6. After the above Byzantine broadcasts finish, perform the following.
• If the above Byzantine broadcast delivers ≥ 2t + 1 1’s: let E contain the corre-
sponding set of E ’s that are received by Pi. For each Ex ∈ E, let majx be the
value sji received from the majority of the parties in Ex. That is, majx satisfies
that |{j ∈ Ex | sji = majx}| ≥ ⌈(Ex + 1)/2⌉. If such a majority does not exist, let
majx =⊥. Find a subset E′ ⊆ E, such that |E′| ≥ t + 1 and for any Ex, Ey ∈ E′,
majx = majy 6=⊥. Denote the above value as maj. Send the value maj to every
party.
• If the above Byzantine broadcast delivers < 2t + 1 1’s: agree on some predefined
message m′ of length l and abort.
7. Let (maj1, · · · ,majn) be the vector where majj is received from Pj in the above step.
Apply DEC on (maj1, · · · ,majn) with c = t and d = 0. Let m0,m1, · · · ,mt be the data
returned by DEC. Output m = m0| · · · |mt.
Figure 6: Protocol Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA
is that, as will be shown later in the proofs, honest parties are the majority in any set Ei and
all have the same message, which can be used to extract enough pieces of identical codewords for
reconstructing the message. The above procedure is done in step 6 and 7.
Lemma 10. For any honest party Pi, if it obtains nonempty set Ei in step 4 of the protocol, then
the honest parties in Ei hold the same message of length l.
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Lemma 11. If all honest parties start with the same input m, then every honest party Pi will
obtain a set Ei 6= ∅.
The proofs for the above lemmas are similar to those of Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 in [18], and are
deferred to Appendix B.
Lemma 12. All honest parties output the same message.
Proof. After the reliable broadcast of a single bit, all honest parties will deliver an identical set of
{0, 1}. Therefore if one honest party delivers < 2t+ 1 1’s and outputs the predefined message m′,
all honest parties will output m′.
Now consider the case where all honest parties deliver ≥ 2t+ 1 1’s for the reliable broadcast of
a single bit. This implies that at least t+1 honest parties Pi send the set Ei to all parties. Denote
the above set of honest parties as H. By Lemma 10, we have all honest parties in Ei have the same
message m of length l. Also, for any two honest parties Pi, Pj above and their set Ei, Ej , we know
that Ei ∩ Ej contains at least one honest party, since |Ei| ≥ 2t + 1 and |Ej | ≥ 2t + 1. Both facts
above imply that all honest parties in Ei ∪ Ej have the same message m.
Since at least t + 1 honest parties send their E set to all parties, the algorithm can find the
feasible set E′ that contains all honest parties that are in H. The conditions “|E′| ≥ t+ 1, for any
Ex, Ey ∈ E′, majx = majy 6=⊥” in step 6a can be satisfied: Honest parties are the majority in any
Ex ∈ E′ since |Ex| ≥ 2t+1, and they have the same message m. Thus for any Ex ∈ E′, majx is the
same. Let (s1, ..., sn) = ENC(m0,m1, ...,mt) where m = m0|m1|...|mt. We know that majx = sx
for all Ex ∈ E′. This implies that majj = sj for all honest party Pj in step 7. Hence at least
2t+ 1 values received by any honest party in step 7 are identical to the corresponding elements in
(s1, ..., sn). Since the codewords used in the protocol are (n, t+1) RS code which corrects at most
t failures, after step 7, all honest parties will recover and output the same message m.
Lemma 13. If all honest parties start with the same input m, then all honest parties output m.
Proof. When all honest parties start with the same input m, by Lemma 11, every honest party Pi
will obtain its set Ei 6= ∅. Then, all honest parties will broadcast a single bit of 1, and deliver at
least 2t + 1 1’s for the broadcast. By the same proof of Lemma 12, all honest parties will output
the same message m.
Theorem 4. Protocol Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA satisfies Termination, Agreement and Validity.
The protocol has communication complexity O(nl + n3 + nB(1)).
Proof. Termination is clearly satisfied. Agreement is proved by Lemma 12, and Validity is proved
by Lemma 13.
Step 1 has communication cost O(n2l/(t+1)) = O(nl). Step 2 has communication cost O(n3).
Step 5 has communication cost O(n3 + nB(1)). Step 6 has communication cost O(nl).
7 Extension Protocols Under Asynchrony
As mentioned, our results on synchronous extension protocols can be extended to the asynchronous
case. The cryptographically secure extension protocols in Section 4 for BA and BB under <
n/2 faults can be adapted to solve BA and reliable broadcast (RB) under < n/3 faults in the
asynchronous setting. Note that under asynchrony, BA or RB is possible under < n/3 faults. No
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extension protocol has been proposed for this case to the best of our knowledge. Our error-free
extension protocols in Section 6 can also be adapted to solve BA and RB under asynchrony. Our
results under asynchrony have been summarized in Table 2 and details are presented in Appendix
C.
8 Conclusion
We investigate and propose several extension protocols with improved communication complexity
for solving Byzantine broadcast and agreement under various settings. We propose simple yet
efficient cryptographically secure extension protocols with improved communication complexity,
for both synchronous Byzantine broadcast and agreement under t < n/2, and for synchronous
Byzantine broadcast under t < (1 − ε)n where ε > 0 is a constant. For t < n/3, we improve the
communication complexity of existing error-free extension protocols for both Byzantine/reliable
broadcast and Byzantine agreement under synchronous or asynchronous settings.
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A An Implementation of Accumulator: the Bilinear Accumulator
To satisfy our assumption in Section 1 on the security parameters being the same order, we can
choose an accumulator implementation called the bilinear accumulator [26]. The bilinear accumu-
lator is collision-free under the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumpition (q-SDH) [26, 19].
Bilinear Pairing. Let G1,G2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p. Let g1, g2
be the corresponding generator, and there exists an isomorphism φ : G2 → G1 such that φ(g2) = g1.
Let GM also be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p, and e : G1 ×G2 → GM is a bilinear
pairing if satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab for all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp;
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1;
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2.
Accumulator Construction. For accumulator construction, we can have G1 = G2 = G
and g1 = g2 = g. The bilinear accumulator works for elements in Z
∗
p and the accumulation
value is an element in G. Therefore, we assume a function f : U → Z∗p that maps any value
in the input domain U to an value in Z∗p. Let D = {d1, ..., dn} be a set of n values in Z∗p after
applying the function f . Let s denote a trapdoor that is hidden from all parties participating
in the extension protocol. Before the extension protocol starts, all parties obtain a set of q-
SDH public parameters 〈gs, gs2 , ..., gsn 〉, either via the trusted setup or MPC protocols [26]. Let
CD(x) = (x + d1)(x + d2) · · · (x + dn) denote the characteristic polynomial of D with coefficients
c0, c1, ..., cn, so that CD(x) = (x + d1)(x + d2) · · · (x + dn) = c0 + c1x + ... + cnxn. Let qi(x) =
CD(x)
x+di
=
∏
j 6=i(x+ dj) = c
(i)
0 + c
(i)
1 x+ ...+ c
(i)
n−1x
n−1 denote the quotient polynomial.
• Gen(1k, n) returns a uniformly random tuple ak = (p,G,GM , e, g) of bilinear pairings param-
eters, where p is of size k.
• Eval(ak,D) computes and returns the accumulation value as z = gCD(s) = gc0+c1s+...+cnsn =
gc0(gs)c1 · · · (gsn)cn .
• CreateWit(ak, z, di) computes and returns the witness wi as wi = g
CD(x)
s+di = gc
(i)
0 +c
(i)
1 s+...+c
(i)
n−1s
n−1
=
gc
(i)
0 (gs)c
(i)
1 · · · (gsn−1)c(i)n−1 if di ∈ D, and wi = ⊥ if di /∈ D.
• Verify(ak, z, wi, di) tests whether e(gdi · gs, wi) = e(z, g) where e is the bilinear pairing, and
return the result.
Since p is of size k, and the accumulation value z or any witness wi is an element in the group
Zp, they all have size k bits. It is believed that this gives Θ(k) bits of security.
B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 10. We show the following properties are satisfied if Pi is able to obtain its Ei in
step 3.
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• The honest parties in Ci hold the same message of length l.
By the definition of (n, t)-star, |Di| ≥ n − t and any two parties Pj ∈ Ci, Pk ∈ Di are
connected by an edge. This implies that Di contains at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 honest parties
{Pi1 , Pi2 , ..., Piq}, and every honest party Pj ∈ Ci connects to all those honest parties. Then
for any honest party Pj ∈ Ci, by definition we have sjix = sixix for all x = 1, 2, ..., q where
q ≥ t + 1. This means that the codewords of each honest party in C have at least t + 1
elements in common. Since the codewords used in the protocol are (n, t + 1) RS code, all
honest parties in Ci hold the same message of length l. Let the common message be m, and
let (s1, ..., sn) = ENC(m0,m1, ...,mt) where m = m0|m1|...|mt.
• Every honest party Pj ∈ Fi holds sj.
Recall every honest party Pj ∈ Fi has at least t + 1 neighbors in Ci, and therefore at least
1 honest neighbor Pk in Ci. Since Pj , Pk are neighbors, sjj of Pj equals skj of Pk. Since Pk
holds message m, skj = sj, which implies that Pj holds sj.
• The honest parties in Ei hold the same message of length l.
Recall every honest party Pi ∈ E has at least 2t + 1 neighbors in F , and therefore at least
t+1 honest neighbors {Pi1 , Pi2 , ..., Piq} in F where q ≥ t+1. Since Pi and Pix are connected,
siix = sixix for 1 ≤ x ≤ q. Recall that sixix = six . Therefore the codewords of Pi has at least
t+1 elements identical to the elements of (s1, ..., sn), where (s1, ..., sn) = ENC(m0,m1, ...,mt)
where m = m0|m1|...|mt. Since the codewords used in the protocol are (n, t+1) RS code, all
honest parties in Ei hold the same message of length l.
Proof of Lemma 11. When all honest parties have the same input m, they will generate the same
codewords. This implies all honest parties will connect to each other in Gi, which forms a clique
of size ≥ 2t+ 1.
First we show that Ci contains at least t+ 1 honest parties. Recall that in the protocol STAR,
Ci = (P\N)\T , where N is the set of matched parties in the complementary graph of G, and T
is the set of parties that connects to both endpoints of a matching. For any honest party Pj ∈ N
such that (Pj , Pk) ∈ M , it is ensured that Pk is Byzantine since Pj , Pk have conflicting messages.
Similarly, for any honest party Pj ∈ T such that (Px, Py) ∈M , (Pj , Px) ∈ E and (Pj , Py) ∈ E, both
Px and Py are ensured to be Byzantine since they have conflicting messages with Pj . Therefore, for
any honest party excluded from Ci = (P\N)\T , there exists at least one corresponding Byzantine
party excluded from Ci as well. Since there are at most t Byzantine parties, at most t honest parties
are excluded from Ci. Hence Ci contains at least t + 1 honest parties. Since Ci contains at least
t+ 1 honest parties, Fi, Ei will subsequently contain all honest parties and have size ≥ 2t+ 1.
C Asynchronous Extension Protocols
In this section, we present extended results for the asynchronous settings, which are summarized
earlier in Table 2 in Section 7. We present asynchronous extension protocols for reliable broadcast
and Byzantine agreement, for both cryptographically secure case (Appendix C.1) and error-free
case (Appendix C.2). The definition of asynchronous reliable broadcast is the following.
Definition 4 (Asynchronous Reliable Broadcast). A protocol for a set of parties P = {P1, ..., Pn},
where a distinguished party called the sender Ps ∈ P holds an initial l-bit input m, is an asyn-
chronous broadcast protocol tolerating an adversary A, if the following properties hold
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• Termination. If the sender is honest, then every honest party eventually outputs a message.
Otherwise, if some honest party outputs a message, then every honest party eventually outputs
a message.
• Agreement. If some honest party outputs a message m′, then every honest party eventually
outputs m′.
• Validity. If the sender is honest, all honest parties eventually output the message m.
C.1 Asynchronous Cryptographically Secure Extension Protocols
Without loss of generality, we assume the number of Byzantine parties is t = ⌊n−13 ⌋ in this section.
Let b = n− t.
Input of the sender Ps: An l-bit message ms
Primitive: asynchronous Byzantine agreement oracle, asynchronous reliable broadcast oracle,
cryptographic accumulator with Eval, CreateWit, Verify
Protocol for party Pi:
1. If i = s, perform the following. Compute Ds = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉) = Encode(ms, b).
Compute the accumulation value zs = Eval(ak,Ds). Send ms to every party, and
broadcast zs by invoking a k-bit asynchronous reliable broadcast oracle.
2. When receiving the messagem from the sender, and the reliable broadcast above outputs
z, perform the following. Compute Di = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉) = Encode(m, b). Compute
the accumulation value and auxiliary information zi = Eval(ak,Di). If zi = z, set
happyi = 1, otherwise set happyi = 0.
3. If happyi = 1, invoke Distribute(Di, ak, z).
4. Wait for the first valid (si, wi) pair such that Verify(ak, z, wi, 〈i, si〉) = true, then send
(si, wi) to all other parties.
5. If happyi = 1, set oi = mi. Otherwise, perform the following. Wait for at least n − t
valid pairs {(sj , wj)} such that Verify(ak, z, wj , 〈j, sj〉) = true for each (sj , wj) from Pj .
Let Si = ((〈1, s1〉, w1), ..., (〈n, sn〉, wn)), where (sj , wj) is the pair received from party
Pj . Compute oi = Reconstruct(Si, ak, z, t). Compute D′i = Encode(oi, b), and invoke
Distribute(D′i, ak, z).
6. Output oi.
Figure 7: Protocol Asynchronous Crypto. n3 -RB
Lemma 14. If an honest party Pi invokes Distribute with Di = Encode(m, b), then any honest
party Pj eventually output oj = m.
Proof. By the agreement condition of asynchronous reliable broadcast used in step 1, if any honest
party obtains z, then any honest party also eventually obtains z. Then at step 2, by Lemma 2, any
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Input of every party Pi: An l-bit message mi
Primitive: asynchronous Byzantine agreement oracle, cryptographic accumulator with Eval,
CreateWit, Verify
Protocol for party Pi:
1. Compute Di = (〈1, s1〉, ..., 〈n, sn〉) = Encode(mi, b). Compute the accumulation value
zi = Eval(ak,Di). Input zi to an instance of k-bit asynchronous Byzantine agreement
oracle.
2. When the above ABA outputs z, if z = zi, set happyi = 1, otherwise set happyi = 0.
Input happyi to an instance of 1-bit asynchronous Byzantine agreement oracle.
3. • If the above ABA outputs 0, output oi = ⊥ and abort.
• If the above ABA outputs 1 and happyi = 1, invoke Distribute(Di, ak, z).
4. Wait for a valid (si, wi) pair such that Verify(ak, z, wi, 〈i, si〉) = true, then send (si, wi)
to all other parties.
5. If happyi = 1, set oi = mi. Otherwise, perform the following. Wait for at least n−t valid
pairs {(sj , wj)} from the previous step that satisfies Verify(ak, z, wj , 〈j, sj〉) = true. Let
Si = ((〈1, s1〉, w1), ..., (〈n, sn〉, wn)), where (sj, wj) is the pair received from party Pj .
Compute oi = Reconstruct(Si, ak, z, t).
6. Output oi.
Figure 8: Protocol Asynchronous Crypto. n3 -BA
honest party Pj with happyj = 1 has the identical message m corresponding to z, and sets oj = m
at step 5. For other honest parties, the honest party Pi with happyi = 1 invokes Distribute
to compute witness wj for each index value 〈j, sj〉, and sends the valid (sj, wj) pair computed
from message m to party Pj for every Pj . By Lemma 1, the Byzantine parties cannot generate a
different pair (s′j , w
′
j) that can be verified. Therefore, in step 4, every honest party Pj eventually
receives at least one valid (sj, wj) pair, and forwards it to all other parties. Since there are at
least n − t honest parties, in step 5, each honest party will eventually receive at least n − t valid
coded values. In Reconstruct, using the accumulation value associated with the coded value, any
party Pj can detect the corrupted values and remove them. By the property of RS codes, since
n − b = t ≥ 2c + d = t, any honest party Pj with happyj = 0 is able to recover the message m,
and any honest party Pj with happyj = 1 already has the message m. Therefore all honest parties
output m.
Lemma 15. If the sender is honest and has input ms, all honest parties eventually output the same
message ms.
Proof. If the sender is honest, every honest party eventually receive ms, and the asynchronous
reliable broadcast eventually outputs the corresponding accumulation value zs according to the
termination condition of asynchronous reliable broadcast. Then in step 2, any honest party Pi
computes a matching accumulation value zi = zs with ms, and sets happyi = 1. Then any honest
24
party Pi sets oi = m in step 5 since happyi = 1. Hence, all honest parties output m when the
protocol terminates.
Lemma 16. If some honest party outputs a message m, then every honest party eventually outputs
m.
Proof. Suppose any honest party Pi outputs oi = m.
If Pi has happyi = 1 at step 5, it invokes Distribute at step 3. Then by Lemma 14, all honest
parties eventually output m. If Pi has happyi = 0 at step 5, then it reconstructs the message m
from Reconstruct, and invokes Distribute. Then by Lemma 14, all honest parties eventually
output m.
Theorem 5. Protocol Asynchronous Crypto. n3 -RB satisfies Termination, Agreement and Validity.
The protocol has communication complexity O(nl + B(k) + kn2).
Proof. Termination is proved by Lemma 15 and 16. Agreement is proved by Lemma 16. Validity
is proved by Lemma 15.
Step 1 has cost O(nl+B(k)), where k is the size of the cryptographic accumulator. Step 3 and 5
in total have cost O(nl+kn2), since each honest party invokes at most one instance of Distribute,
which leads to an all-to-all communication with each message of size O(l/b+ k) = O(l/n+ k). For
step 4, it also has cost O(nl + kn2). Hence the total cost is O(nl + B(k) + kn2).
Theorem 6. Protocol Asynchronous Crypto. n3 -BA satisfies Termination, Agreement and Validity,
and has communication complexity O(nl+A(k) + kn2).
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1.
C.2 Asynchronous Error-free Extension Protocols
We can extend Protocol Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA from Section 6 to an asynchronous reliable
broadcast, as presented in Figure 9. For brevity, we only present the difference. Since the system is
asynchronous and the channel is reliable, each party can only expect to receive the messages from
honest parties eventually. Thus, instead of receiving all vectors and then constructing the sets as
in the step 3, 4 of the synchronous protocol, each party can only try to construct the sets every
time a new message is received as in step 3, 4. Similar to the synchronous protocol, the parties can
obtain enough pieces of correct codewords to reconstruct the message as in step 6 and 7.
Lemma 17. For any honest party Pi, if it obtains nonempty set Ei in step 4 of the protocol, then
the honest parties in Ei hold the same message of length l.
Proof. Same proof of Lemma 10 applies.
Lemma 18. If the sender is honest, then every honest party Pi will eventually obtain a set Ei 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma is similar to that of Lemma 11. If the sender is honest, all honest
parties eventually receive the same message m in step 1, and they will generate the same codewords.
This implies all honest parties eventually will be connected to each other in Gi, which forms a clique
of size ≥ 2t + 1. By the same argument from the proof of Lemma 11, Ci contains at least t + 1
honest parties. Since Ci contains at least t + 1 honest parties and honest parties will eventually
form a clique of size ≥ 2t+1 in Gi, Fi, Ei will subsequently contain all honest parties and have size
≥ 2t+ 1.
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Input of the sender Ps: An l-bit message ms
Primitive: Asynchronous reliable broadcast oracle for a single bit, STAR
Protocol for party Pi:
1. If i = s, send ms to every party. Wait until receiving the message mi from the sender.
2. Same as step 1 of Protocol Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA.
3. When receiving sjj and sji from Pj , send OK(Pi, Pj) to every party if sij = sjj. Construct
an undirected graph Gi with parties in P as vertices. Add an edge (Px, Py) every time
when OK(Px, Py) is received from Px and OK(Py, Px) is received from Py. If the edge
(Px, Py) is new, invoke STAR(Gi).
4. Same as step 4 of Protocol Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA.
5. If the set Ei is obtained for the first time, broadcast a single bit of 1 using the single-bit
Byzantine broadcast primitive and send Ei to every party. Stop updating Gi.
6. When the above reliable broadcast delivers ≥ 2t+1 1’s, perform the step 6(a) of Protocol
Synchronous Error-free n3 -BA.
7. On receiving 2t + 1 + r values majj ’s where majj is sent by Pj , apply DEC with c = r
and d = t − r. If DEC returns ‘failure’, wait for more values. If DEC returns the data
m0,m1, · · · ,mt, output m = m0| · · · |mt.
Figure 9: Protocol Asynchronous Error-free n3 -RB
Lemma 19. If some honest party outputs a message m′, then every honest party eventually outputs
m′.
Proof. If some honest party outputs a message m′, then the reliable broadcast in step 6 delivers
≥ 2t + 1 1’s. By the definition of reliable broadcast, eventually all honest parties will deliver an
identical set of {0, 1}. Therefore eventually, every honest party will deliver ≥ 2t+ 1 1’s.
By the same argument from the proof of Lemma 12, at least t + 1 honest parties Pi send the
set Ei to all parties, and for any honest parties Pi, Pj above, all honest parties in Ei ∪ Ej have the
same message m. Then the conditions for the set E′ in step 6 is satisfied, which leads to identical
majx. Let (s1, ..., sn) = ENC(m0,m1, ...,mt) where m = m0|m1|...|mt. We know that majx = sx for
all Ex ∈ E′. This implies that majj = sj for all honest party Pj in step 7. On receiving 2t+ 1 + r
values where 0 ≤ r ≤ t, party Pi try to decode the message with c = r and d = t − r ≥ 0 which
satisfies that 2t+1+ r− (t+1) ≥ 2c+d. If there are more than r corrupted values, DEC will return
‘failure’, and wait for more values. Eventually every honest party Pi will receive enough values to
successfully decode m. Since one honest party outputs the message m′, we have m = m′.
Lemma 20. If the sender is honest, all honest parties eventually output the message m.
Proof. If the sender is honest, by Lemma 18, every honest party Pi will eventually obtain its set
Ei 6= ∅. Then, all honest parties will broadcast a single bit of 1, and eventually deliver at least
2t + 1 1’s for the broadcast. Then by the same proof of Lemma 19, all honest parties will output
the same message m.
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Theorem 7. Protocol Asynchronous Error-free n3 -RB satisfies Termination, Agreement and Va-
lidity. The protocol has communication complexity O(nl + n3 log n+ nB(1).
Proof. Termination is proven by Lemma 19 and 20. Agreement is proved by Lemma 19, and
Validity is proved by Lemma 20.
Step 1 and 2 has communication cost O(nl + n2l/(t + 1)) = O(nl). Step 3 has communication
cost O(n3 log n). Step 5 has communication cost O(n3 + nB(1)). Step 6 has communication cost
O(nl).
Error-free extension protocol for asynchronous Byzantine agreements under t < n/3. From the
improved asynchronous error-free reliable broadcast protocol, we can obtain a better asynchronous
error-free Byzantine agreement (ABA) protocol, directly via the same construction from [27]. The
new protocol has communication complexity O(nl + n4 log n+ n2B(1) + nA(1)).
D A Note on Prior Results
The (n2 )-BA protocol in [18] has a small flaw that the adversary can exploit to increase the com-
munication complexity to Ω(n2l). In this section, we will describe the issue and provide a simple
fix.
For completeness, we provide the original protocol (n2 )-BA in Figure 3 of [18]. From the protocol,
the step 6 asks any party to send a O( l+1
dj
+ nk)-bit message to some party Pj ∈ P \ Psm, if dj is
received from Pj. Since dj = ⌈(|Pjhmsm|+1)/2⌉, |Pjhmsm| ≥ n− 2t and n ≥ 2t+1, it is possible that
dj = 1. Therefore t Byzantine parties can send to all other parties the message dj = 1 in step 5,
which will trigger all other parties to send back messages each of length O( l+11 + nk) = O(l + nk)
bits. Therefore, step 6 will have communication complexity O(tn(l + nk)) = O(n2l + n3k) instead
of O(nl+ n3k) as claimed in [18].
Here we provide a simple fix to resolve the issue above. Basically, we cannot allow Byzantine
parties to deceive all other parties by requiring a large block of O(l)-bits. Then the key step of our fix
is to change the “Send happyi to all parties in P” in step 4 to “Broadcast happyi using the single-bit
broadcast oracle”. After the broadcast, in step 5, any honest party Pi can construct identical sets
Piconflict = Pconflict and Pihmsm = Phmsm, and compute an identical value di = d = ⌈(|Phmsm|+1)/2⌉.
Then in step 6, any honest party Pi in Phmsm will perform the same encoding, and send (yi,Hi) to
all parties in P \ Psm. Rest of the steps remain the same.
To see the communication complexity is correct after the fix, notice that only |Phmsm| honest
parties will send a O( l+1
d
+nk)-bit message to each party in P\Psm. Since d = ⌈(|Phmsm|+1)/2⌉, we
have the communication complexity of step 6 equals O(|P \Psm| · |Phmsm|( l+1d +nk)) = O(nl+n3k).
Also, the broadcast in step 4 incurres O(nB(1)) cost, and rest of the protocol has the same cost,
thus in total O(nl + n3k + nkB(1)).
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Input of every party Pi: An l-bit message mi
Primitive: Byzantine broadcast oracle for a single bit, cryptographic collision-resistant hash
function Hash
Checking Phase. Every party Pi does the following:
1. Compute a hash of the message mi as hi = Hash(mi) and broadcast hi.
2. Check if at least n− t broadcasted hashes are equal. If no n− t broadcasted hashes are
equal, output oi = ⊥ and terminate. Otherwise, let h denote the common hash value
broadcasted by at least n− t parties. Then form Psm as teh set of parties broadcasting
h.
Agreement Phase. Every party Pi does the following:
1. If Pi ∈ Psm, set output message oi = mi.
2. Form an injective function from P \ Psm to Psm, by say, mapping the party with the
smallest index in P \Psm to the party with the smallest index in Psm, i.e., φ : P \Psm →
Psm.
3. If Pi ∈ Psm and Pi = φ(Pj), then send oj to Pj .
4. If Pi ∈ P \ Psm and received a value say, o′j from Pj ∈ Psm in the previous round such
that Pj = φ(Pi), then check if Hash(o
′
j) = h. If the test passes, set happyi = 1 and
assign output message oi = o
′
j, else set happyj = 0. Send happyi to all parties in P.
5. If Pi ∈ P \ Psm and happyi = 0, then construct a set Piconflict consisting of the parties
Pj , φ(Pj) such that happyj received from Pj in the previous step is 0 and Pj belongs to
P \ Psm. Set Pihmsm = P \ Piconflict, di = ⌈(|Pihmsm|+ 1)/2⌉ and send di to all the parties
belonging to Pi
hmsm
and nothing to all the others.
6. If dj is received from Pj ∈ P \ Psm,
6.1. Transform the message oi into a polynomial over GF (2
c), for c = ⌈l+1/dj⌉ denoted
by fi with degree dj − 1.
6.2. Compute the c-bit piece yi = fi(i), Hi = (Hash(fi(1)), · · · , Hash(fi(n))) and sends
(yi,Hi) to Pj .
7. If Pi ∈ P \ Psm and happyi = 0, check each piece yi received from each Pj ∈ Pjhmsm
against the jth entry of every hash value vector Hk received from Pk ∈ Pihmsm. If at least
di of the hash values match a piece yi, then accept yi, otherwise reject it. Interpolate the
polynomial f from the di accepted pieces yi, and compute the message m corresponding
to the polynomial f . Set oi = m.
8. Output oi and terminate.
Figure 10: Protocol Synchronous Crypto. n2 -BA from [18]
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